In Naturally Free Action, Oisin Deery argues that free will exists, where free will is understood as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of that ability. Deery reaches his conclusion by showing how the concept of free will plausibly refers to many actual human behaviors, and how these behaviors count as a natural category or kind. Deery also addresses the role of phenomenology in fixing the reference of the concept, arguing that our phenomenology as of deciding or acting freely is typically accurate, even if determinism is true. The result is a realist, naturalistic framework for theorizing about free will, according to which free will almostcertainly exists and we act freely. Deery's position mostly sidesteps the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism. Even so, Deery maintains that his natural-kind view about free will supports compatibilism and provides compatibilists with an attractive way to be realists aboutfree will. Deery also responds to recent empirical threats to free will, including those posed by findings about behaviors caused by implicit biases. Finally, Deery shows how his view possesses the resources to address emerging questions about whether artificially intelligent agents might ever act freely or be responsible for their behaviors, and if so in what sense.