Gerechtigkeit und Frieden sind zentrale Werte menschlichen Zusammenlebens, aber auch Kernbegriffe unterschiedlicher wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen. Wie beide Begriffe zueinander stehen - ob man die Komplementarität oder das Spannungsverhältnis betonen soll, ob man der Gerechtigkeit oder dem Frieden Vorrang einräumen soll - ist dabei höchst umstritten. Der Band vereint Beiträge international ausgewiesener Autoren aus Politischer Theorie, Philosophie, Politikwissenschaft, Geschichte, Ethnologie und Völkerrecht, die das schwierige Verhältnis von Gerechtigkeit und Frieden ausloten.

Gunther Hellmann ist Professor für Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Frankfurt am Main und Gastprofessor am Bologna Center der Johns Hopkins University.

The original title of the conference on which this volume is based avoided a choice about how to relate the two concepts of justice and peace to one another. They can, and often are, connected in a non-contrasting fashion ("and") and/or in terms of an alternative ("or"). Whether one or the other connection is used is suggestive in itself, but in both cases it still leaves a broader set of possibilities as to how one conceives of the underlying relationship. Two basic choices seem to stand out: One would be to relate "justice" and "peace" in terms of symmetry or asymmetry. The relationship would then be construed either in terms of normative equivalence or hierarchically-ie. one being more important from a normative point of view than the other. Alternatively one could connect them in terms of either conceptual interdependence or conceptual independence-ie. one might emphasize the "and" in the title and argue that justice and peace are mutually dependent or one could conceive of both concepts as being mutually exclusive-ie. that one has to choose between them in an either/or fashion. The prominence and particular expression of any of these ways of connecting peace and justice in different academic disciplines depends as much on disciplinary focus and traditions as it depends on specific knowledge-constitutive interests when scholars work on a particular research problem. As a result both the conceptualization of "justice" and "peace" and the connection being made between them figure quite differently in this volume due to the fact that the Cluster of Excellence on "The Formation of Normative Orders" brings together a heterogeneous interdisciplinary group of political scientists, philosophers, historians, cultural anthropologists and international law scholars. It is against this background that we thought that the title "Justice and/or Peace" would be fitting for such an interdisciplinary exchange. After all it was intended to reflect the breadth of intellectual engagement with these two concepts among colleagues from different disciplines within the Cluster as well as between them and colleagues from other universities. In chapter 2 Michael Doyle examines the roots of the "Responsibility to Protect" (RtoP) in international law and international ethics. RtoP, Doyle argues, is in tension with established Charter law on the use of force, but it may be beginning to change the law. From the perspective of Liberal international ethics the theme of humanitarian intervention is deeply familiar in both its communitarian and cosmopolitan variants. Even the Realist and Marxist traditions include commitments to human respect that make humanitarian concerns far from foreign. The norm of RtoP builds on but narrows the liberal tradition in ways that expand international legitimacy and address the concerns of many skeptics of humanitarian intervention. The chapter further explores how RtoP evolved out of the crisis in Kosovo in the 1990s and discusses its policy significance in the contemporary world in cases in which it has been invoked-ranging from Myanmar to Kenya, Guinea and Libya. Doyle concludes that RtoP as a policy doctrine is significant but likely to remain less than revolutionary. Straightforward as the provisions of the 2005 UN Outcome Document may appear, both their significance and the will to implement them are far from clear. By contributing to the increasing pluralism of the normative architecture of world politics RtoP has produced some confusion. However, this confusion may gradually recede as RtoP norms are accumulated in customary law and reshape the discourse of international ethics. Harald Müller examines the relationship between justice and peace in chapter 3 from a different angle arguing that "good things do not always go together". He starts with the premise that our endorsement of justice is deeply embedded in Western thought. It found expression most recently in the shape of democracy promotion. Yet, while such efforts do sometimes yield moderately peaceful results (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina) they can also led to more doubtful (e.g. Congo) or even outright disastrous outcomes (e.g. Afghanistan). In terms of a conceptual history of justice and peace, Müller introduces both as distinct but mutually related states of social and political affairs: Justice describes a state in which actors get what they are entitled to according to commonly agreed standards of distribution. Peace, in contrast, describes a state in which actors are not threatened by physical harm or even death by the willful acts of other actors wielding, or aspiring to, political power. Müller then shows how justice and peace can be at odds since heterogeneous claims to justice may act as a driver of political conflict. Noting that there can never be a truly universalistic account of justices as each actor always theorizes from within her own cultural context, he asks how we may escape this conundrum. His answer is twofold. Firstly he holds that we must identify justice conflicts without falling back into the trap of particularistic notions. He proposes a version of speech-act theory which employs the concept of justice only as a rhetorical structure devoid of any a priori meaning. Its task is to tease out different claims to justice, here understood as claims for an "entitlement". He substantiates the efficiency of such an approach empirically, nevertheless stressing the multiple and divergent understandings of justice that do become apparent. This leads to Müller's second answer-the idea that a universalistic account of justice can only emerge as the result of practical consent by the greatest possible number of actors. He concludes by proposing that such an "empirical universalism" can only emerge "from the busy, boring, controversial and inglorious and unsung reconstructive work of the diplomatic ants which populate the closed rooms of global negotiations, and their friendly non-governmental assistants which impact most of the time from the sidelines." In contrast to Müller, Rainer Forst's chapter approaches the question of the relationship between justice and peace from the perspective of the actors who raise basic claims to live in a justifiable social order and are thus the agents of "orders of justification." He unfolds his main conceptual thesis that justice is a principle and a basic demand, while peace is a value qualified by justice and is in its core demanded by justice. Forst then identifies a major Western tradition of thinking of the relation between justice and peace within the framework of a normative order of priorities between the two. Within this tradition a major line of thought culminates in Kant's call for the establishment of a universal system of law as the precondition and foundation of perpetual and justifiable forms of peace. Taking this claim to the level of the international political system, Forst argues for the formula "peace by law" and for a legitimate system of legal justice on the level of international law as the proper connection between justice and peace. Yet, he adds, that while we can follow Kant's idea of a system of law that consists in a system of publicly known principles of right and justice, at the same time, we need to reinterpret Kant's idea of the publicness of these norms in a democratic way once we start thinking beyond the state. Forst then cautions against the lurking danger of agents of democratic order becoming oppressors themselves. For the self-conscious spread of the assumed universal value of a "just order" could then not lead to peace but to war as a means to globally reinforce this idea. He thus argues against the usual foundations of such mistaken actions: putting peace before justice, the reversal of his main thesis. Forst reverts to Kant embracing the idea that justice must not be culturalized and hence subordinated to the idea of "peace first and by any means necessary." He locates the prerogative of ju...

Normative Orders