Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison
Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities?, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 255, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 255
Erschienen am
06.06.2008, 1. Auflage 2008
Beschreibung
Inhaltsangabe1. Incommensurability, as Differences in Quasi-Intuitive Cognitive Capacities: a task for psychology? 2. Incommensurability in a Wittgensteinian Perspective: How to Make Sense of Nonsense? 3. Intra-Theoretical Change, as a Subjective Creative Elucidation of an Objective Formerly Present Content. 4. Investigating the Continuities of Scientific Theorizing: A Task for the Bayesian? 5. From the Cumulativity of Physical Predictions to the Cumulativity of Physics. 6. From Denotational continuity to Entity Realism. 7. Is a Realist Interpretation of Quantum Physics Possible? 8. Ontological Continuity: A Policy for Model Building or an Argument in Favour of Scientific Realism? 9. A Change of Perspective: Dissolving the Incommensurability Problem in the Framework of a Theoretical Pluralism Incorporating an Instrumental Rationality. 10. What Can Philosophical Theories of Scientific Method Do? 11. A New Kind of Incommensurability at the Level of Experimental Practices? 12. Pragmatic Breakdowns: A New Kind of Scientific Revolution?
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Springer Verlag GmbH
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